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3. Hans Schmidt, a cr'tizen and rest~ent of the State of North Carolina, brought an 
action in the State of Virginia against George Voss, a citizen and resident of the 
State of Virginia, to enforce liability under a statute of the State of North 
Carolina which provides: 
ttEvery owner of a motor vehic l e operated upon a public highway shall be 
liable and responsible for death c~ injuries _to person or property resulting 
from negligence in the operation of such motor vehicle in the business of such 
owner or otherwise, by any person legally using or o~erating the same with the 
permission, express or implied, of such owner.n 
At the trial the plaintiff's evidence disclosed that Voss, while in Danville Va. 
loaned his automobile to Henry Yost without restriction upon its use and knowi~g ' 
that Yost intended to operate the ~utomobile in the State of North Carolina, and 
that while operating the automobile in North Carolina, Yost negligently ran over 
Schmidt. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, Voss moved for summary 
judgment on the ground that any attempt to hold him liable by reason of the North 
i.({4 n 
Carolina statute for Yost's actions in that State would violate Federal constitu-
tional guaranties. How should the court rule on this motion? 
(CONSTITUTIONAL LAW) The motion should be overruled. North Carolina has the power to 
make reasonable laws as to who is entitled to use her highways and under what con-
ditions. The laws are just as applicable to residents of North Carolina as to out-
s iders. Hence there is equal protection and due process. The Virginia court should 
give full faith and credit to the North Carolina law. See Young v. Masci, 289 u.s • 
253. 
4 December 1959. 
1. In November of 1959, Perf ec t Investment Corporat i on was indicted in the u.s. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virgini a on the charge of having violated 
the income tax laws. On December 4th, the U.S. Distri ct Attorney caused a subpena 
duces tecum to be issued commanding Arthur Rassmussen, the SecreJ~ry and Treasur er 
or-the Corporation, to produce at the tri al on December 14th all the books of 
account and other financial records of the Corpor ati on f or t he year 1958. Rassmussen 
now consults you and confesses that the producti on of such r ecords will di sclose 
that, on three separate occasions during the year 1958, he embezzled corporate f unds. 
He inquires whether he may successfully refuse to produce the records on the ground 
that such production will tend to incriminate him. What should you advise him? 
(CONSTITUTIONAL LATtl) I would advi se him that he must produce the books . They belong 
to the corporati on and not to him. Besides the embezzlement is a crime agains t 
another sovereign(the Commonwealth of Virginia)and the f act that one's testimony or 
acts may show him to be guilty of a crime against another sovereign will not prevent 
n s1 2. In October of 1959, it was learned that large quantities of narcotics were bei n? 
sold to school children in the City of Richmond. Se?eral raids to discover the 
source of the narcotics were made by the police department thfough the use of 
search warrants, but such raids were unsuccessful, it being apparent that service o:·.' 
the warrants furnished sufficient advance warning to permit concealment of the 
drugs. In an effort to aid the police department, and because of growing public 
clamor, the Council of the City of Ricrwond enacted the following ordinance: 
~The Chief of Police, and each of his duly appointed deputies, may 
enter any building without warrant or other process when having 
reasonable belief that there will be found therein narcotics possessed 
' or placa:.:contrary to law.n 
A few days after the enactment of this ordinance, the Chief of Police without warn-
ing forcibly entered the home of John Eaton, who had a lengthy criminal record and 
who was strongly suspected of being a ringleader in the sale of narcotics. However, 
no narcotics were found on his premises. Shortly thereafter Eaton brought an action 
against the Chief of Police in the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond to 
recover damages of $5,000, alleging that the defendant had been guilty of a tres-
pass. The defendant pleaded the City ordinance in defense of the action. Eaton then 
filed a replication alleging that the City ordinance was void(a)because Jt violatrd 
the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution relating to searches and seizure~, 
and (Q) because it also violated the Fourteenth Amendment of that Constitution. 
How should the Court rule on each of the issues raised by Eaton's replication? 
(CONSTITUTIONAL LAW)(a) The City or~inance does not violate the Fourth Amendment 
as that amendment is applicable to the federal government only. That government is 
bound by both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, while the states are only bound by 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Hence the states have greater leaway than the federal 
government. 
(b) The question here is whether the ordinance allows unreasonable, arbitrary,or 
grossly unfair search procedure. If it does it violates the Fourteenth Amendment. 
If it does not, it is valid, Take one aide or the other, and argue it through. An 
example of an argument for its validity is: 
"'Society is vitally interested in the suppression of traffic in narcotics. The 
ordinance only allows a search without a warrant when there is reasonable belief 
that illegal narcotics are on the premises, and there w~s such a belief in this 
case. Experience has shown that it is not practical to suppress this crime if a few 
moments warning must be given. This is unlike the Supreme Court Baltimore Rat Case, 
in that, in that case, the ordinance allowed entry without a warrant for mere 
purposes of inspection. The rats would not disappear over night. In the instant case 
the ordinance is for the reasonable enforcement of the criminal laws, and hence 
valid." 4 June 1960. 
:::)t;d . 1 u . c . t c . k t t d l.During the course of a strike at the Un1versa n~on wU~ oo, plc e s wer e pos e 
by the uni on at the various entrances to t he plant. The plant , ~owever, continued to 
operat e with the assi s t anc e of appr oximat ely fi f t y per cent of lts work forc e who 
had not joined the strike but stayed on t he job, and of Ct;;)r t ain non-union people who 
were hired to r eplace the striker s . I n an attempt t o dissua.de t hes e workers from 
entering the plant and to induc e t hem t o join the strike , t he pickets made statement s 
to them before the entrance of t he plant embracing obscene and insulting language . 
Wilbur Rutabaga, the most voc i ferous of the picket s, was arres t ed and charged with 
vi olat ing Section 40-64 of the Code of Virginia, which reads: 
505 ~ 
"I t shall be unlawful f or any person s i ngly or i n concert with ot:1ers t o 
inter fere or attempt to i nterfere wi th another in t he ex8rc i.se of his r ight 
't o wo rk or to enter-upon the performance of any l awful vocat i on, by the use 
of f orce , threats of vi olenc e or i ntimidation, or by the use of insulting 
• 
• 
or threatening l anguage di rected toward such person, t o induce or attempt to • 
i nduce him to cquii>iilis employment or refrainfi'om seeking empl oyment . 11 
Rutabega def ended upon the grounds that t his legislat i on is an abric!gment of f ree 
epeech and is invali d class leeislation. I s this true? 
(CONSTITUTIONAL LAW) No. The s t atute is a reasonable exercise of the police power t o 
carry out the public policy of this s t at e on a controver sial sub.jec-t,. There is no 
freedom of speech fo r obsceni ties and pure insults. See 191 Va .857 on p.l824 of t he 
Constitutional Law Cases of these notes. 
• 
• 
• 
-~G O 
2. A statute of one of the states of the Union, Code #1234, requires all persons who 
have been licensed by the state as lawyers, doctors , architects, engineers and 
ministers of the Gospel, and all persons ,.vho should thereafter apply for permission 
to practice those professions in the s tate, tottake the following loyalty oa th: 
"I, , do solemnly s~vsar that I am 1vell acquainted with the terms· 
of Code #1234, and I have carefully considered the pame; that I have never, 
directly or indirectly, done any of the acts tha t Section specifies and 
prohibits; that I will support the Constitution of t he St ate; that I make 
this oath without any mental reservation or evasion and hold it to be bindirJg 
upon me." 
That statute further provides t hat any person l :Leensed to practice any one or more 
of those professions in the state who shall re.fuse to t ake t he oath shall lose his 
license to practice. The statute also provides that any ' per son who thereafter con-
tinues to practice any one or more of t hose professions \vithout t aking the oath 
shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine and i rnprisonmE:rrt, and any person 
w ho shall take the oath falsely shall be guilty of perjury . Mr . Script, who had 
prior to the enactment of that s t atute been licensed by t Le state as an ordained 
minister, consults you. He advises you that he believes he had, prior to the adop-
tion of that provision of the s t a.tute, violated the terms of that statute, and he is 
unwilling to take the oath. He wishes to l~now· whether the state has the right to takE 
away his license as an ordained minister. 'tlfuat would you advise? 
(CONSTITUTIONAL LAW) No. The act is invalid because it is ex post facto, a bill of 
attainder, and, so far as ministers of the gospel are concerued, violation of our 
policy of separation of church and state. 
\\~~ · · 4Dec.l9,60 .519. • 
l.frn April~ 1960, Barnhill was indicted by the grand jury of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, for the armed robbery of the 
employees of Tidewater Federal Loan Company. Armed robbery of a Federal savings and 
loan association's employees is a capital offense by Federal statute. In May,l960, 
Barnhill was indicted for armed robbery of the same employees by the grand jury of 
the Corporation Court of the City of Norfolk. Both indictments referred to the same 
occurrence. 
In June, 1960, Barnhill was tried for the Federal offense and acquitted by the 
jury, after which Barnhill moved the Corporation Court of the City of Norfolk to 
dismiss its indictment against him. He assigned as grounds for his motion to dismiss 
(a)that a trial on the State indictment would be in violation of the Fifth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution, and(b)that his trial in the State Court would 
constitute a denial of due process to him under the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. Assuming that there is no statute of Virginia governing 
the problem, how should the Court rule on grounds(a) and (b)? 
(CONSTITUTIONAL LAW) (a)The Fifth Amendment i s a restrictiqn on the United States 
and not on any state so his motion to dismiss for this reason should be overruled. 
(b) Nor is there any violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The act was a crime 
against the Commonwealth of Virginia also, and it is entitled to try him unless 
such trial is prohibited by some statute. See 359 u.s .121. Note: Virginia has such 
a statute:, to wit V#l9.1·259 • 
2;>~he Constitution of State A. provides: 
ttNo individual or corporation or association of any kind shall enter into @1Y con-
tract to exclude persons from employment because of membership in or nonmembership 
in a labor organization." 
The Federal Railway Labor Act provides: 
"N-otwithstanding any other statute or law of the United States, or Territory 
thereof, or of any State, any carrier and a labor organization duly designated and 
authorited to represent employees shall be permitted to make agreements requiring, 
as a condition of continued employment, that within sixty days following the beginn-
ing of such employment all employees shall become members of the labor organization 
representing their craft or class." 
The Brotherhood of Trackmen and the New York and Utah Railroad entered into an 
agreement requiring all trackwalkers·employed by the railroad to join the Brother-
hood within sixty days or lose their jobs, Is this provision of the contract 
valid in State A.? 
(CONSTITUTIONAL LAW) Yes. By the United States Constitution the Congress has control 
over interstate commerce. Railroad labor is so closely tied to the operation of 
trains in interstate commerce that it is subject to regulation by Congress. The 
Constitution of the United States and laws passed by Congress pursuant to powers 
given the United States thereunder are the supreme law of the land regardless of 
state laws and state constitutions. See 335 U.S.225. 
1;41 4 December 1961. 
1. An ordinance of the City of Aloxandria, Virginia, reads as follows: "Any per-
son who may desire to use t!1e streets, l e.nes and other public places of the City 
for the purpose of soliciting contributions, or selling any articles or things for 
<::haritable or other purposes, shall first obtain a l-JTitten rermi t from the Director 
of Public Safety so to do, and any person who so uses the s.:.id streets, lanes and 
other public places of the City without first obtaining a permit from the Director 
of Public Safety shall be liable to a f ine of not less th<m ten nor more than one 
hundred dollars.fl 
Culher Post, a member of a crew oi sa1esmen selling subscriptions to three of 
the leading ne~v-s magCJ.zines, was convicted in the Corporation C:mrt of the City of 
Alexandria of selling subscriptions on t he straets of tha city without complying 
with the above ordinance and fined the sum of $100. He has appealed the conviction 
alleging that th8 o:tdinance under which he 1·Jas con-..ricted is c.n unconstitutional one 
because it violates const itutional guarantees respecting freedom of speech o.nd press 
How should the court ru1e? 
( CCNSTI'I'UTIONAL LA.1t/) The court should rule in fc.vor of Pc·st. The ordinance is un-
consti tutional for tvw 1·easons: (1) The policy of the law and the legal principles 
Hhich are to control the d.i~;retion c: tho administrat,ive officer C?.re not set forth. 
On its face, it delega ~.es po ,rers es2Emtially l eg:i.slat·.'t. VG to an dminist -..~~~tive offi-
cer, and gives to him <.lrbitrc~ry c:md capricions power t.o r,ra'1t or deny a pennit. 
(2) It violates § 12 of the •i:_rgim.a Constitution 1"lhish ~)ro>:ides that rr ,, lW citizen 
may freely speak, write and publish hi s sentiments on all subjects. 11 T:}e word 
"publish" means "to bring before t 1~e public as .for sale or distribution, rr subject, 
however, to reasonable police regulo.tions with resped, to traffic and the preserva-
tion of law and order . S0e 49 S.E.2d 697, lFlS Va. Ll3 at the bottom of p. 1817 of 
the Constitutional Law c3.ses in 1'~~ ,3se notes. 
· -
. -
• 
• 
1 2. DltJ!.ssume that a statute of Vir.;i n.La provides that: "It i3 unlawful for any motor 
1 
veh1 cle dealer to sell or offer i'or sale any nmv motor vehicle unless he shall have 
a wri tten contract or .franchise with the manufacturer or c..uthori zed distributor or 
' dealer of that particular make of ne·w motor veh~. cle." . . . 
Assume also that the sk1.tute proYides that . a nev.r motor velnr:le ~s def~ne~ as "a 
motor vehicle v.rhich has been titled t drty (JO) day:-.> or less in other th~n lt~ 
manufacturer's or doaler·'s nm11e, <:'1d has not been driven more than )00 rnl~es. " 
X CorlPany of Norfollc a.ppli.ed to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to lSSue a 
:;> ~i. 
J.:Lcense that would permit i t to sell ne<><T m0tor vehicle s . X Company has for 8ev-
er al years had a vrell established bu ~:in8ss in t he Ci ty of Norfolk and maintat ns a 
~·j e:Ll-equipped estA.blishl"lent, sales room a11d repair shop, and its plant and facil-
ities meet all statutory requirements for such an undertaking . The faciEties 
are more adequate and better than those of the average enfranchised dealer i:! tLjs 
, Stc.te. HoweYer, X Company does not have a franchise with any automobile ma.nufa1:-
turer. The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles refused to issue the license on the 
grou.nd that the lm-J of Virginia makes it unla:tvful to issue a license to dee.l in 
nev.r automobiles unless the applicant for such license is authorized to do so ty 
' a written cont:-:-act or franchise with the :nanufacturer, distributor or dealer of a 
particular make of vehicle . 
X Company now consults you as to 1-Jhether t he statute r r;c;uiring it to have a 
written cont,ract or franchise is valid. How 1o7ould you advise X · Company? 
(CONSTITUTIONAL Lf.\.W) The statute is invalid. It is cl early class legislati on 
having no logical relationship to the health, mo:cals or general vJelfare. Dealers 
with franchises have no monopoly on inteerity. 192 Va. 627 on p. 1824 of the 
Constituttonal I.a-1-J cases in these notes . 
,<'f..?- 4 June 1962. lr~~ October l,l96l,the State Highway Dept., as authorized by statute, announced 
it~ plan to build a four-lane highway from Pulaski to Wytheville, via a tunnel 
through Pulaski Mountain. Bids were requested for the construction of the tun~£1. 
After considering the bids received, the Department accepted the bid of Tunnel 
Tubes, Inc., and a construction contract was duly entered into between the Depart-
ment and the corporation. 
After Tunnel Tubes,Inc., had moved all necessary equipment to the site, but before 
construction was begun, the General Assembly at its 1962 session enacted a statute 
pr<?Viding that no existing or future agreement for the construction of highway 
tunnel~ should be valid unless approved by the Governor. Although the statute was 
general in its terms, it was enacted because of a clear showing that the tunnel to be 
constructed by Tunnel Tubes, Inc., was wholly unnecessary and would result in 
financial loss to the Commonwealth and its taxpayers in a sum exceeding $6,000,000. 
Shortly thereafter the Highway Department sought the Governor's approval of the 
contract with Tunnel Tubes, Inc. This was refused, and the Depaetment promptly noti-
fied Tunnel Tubes,Inc., ti1at it would not observe the agreement. Tunnel Tube5,!nc., 
now consults you and shows that its reliance on the agreement has caused it to.incur 
expenses of ~U2,000, and that performance of the agreement will cause it to realize 
a profit of not less than $1,250,000. It seeks your advJ.ce on whether it has a cause 
of action against the Highway Dept. for breach of contract. What should your advise 
be? 
ptLge ;>oo. 
(CONS'fi'I'UTIONAL LAW) Yes, it has a cause of action against the Highway Department. 
The Commonwealth has consented to be sued for breach of contract. The legislation 
in uhconstitutional since the federal constitution prohibits any state from pass inG 
any law impairing the obligation of a contract. See V#8-752 and Article 1, section 
10 of the Constitution of the United States • 
~~ . 2~~he Legislature of the State of Tennessee enacted a statute providing that one 
who conspires with another to injure a person in his trade or business, and causes 
such injury, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and punished accordingly. In June of 
1962 the Attorney General of Tennessee wrote a letter to Tennessee Tobacco Packers 
Union, Local No.JOJ, charging it with violation of the statute and stating that he 
intended promptly to bring proceedings to prosecute Local No.303 therefor. Local 
No.303 has now sought an injunction in the United States District Court of Tennes~q. 
to prevent such prosecution, contending in its complaint that the statute, properly 
construed, is not applicable to labor union activities. The Attorney General has 
filed a motion seeking dismissal of the proceeding, asserting that whether the 
statute is applicable to the activities of labor unions is an issue which should be 
resolved by the courts of Tennessee. How should the District Court rule on the 
motion of the Attorney General? 
(CONSTITUTIONAL LAW) The motion of the Attorney General should be granted. The meal" 
ing of state statutes is for the state to decide. If the state decides that the 
statute does not apply to l.a.bor unions then there is no need for the federal courts 
to pass on the matter, and no federal question will be involved. See Harrison v. 
N.A.A.C.P. 360 U.S.l67. 
2~e constitution of one of the state~ of the union had for many years contained ~ 
provision that directors of corporations were obligated to the creditors of the 
corporation for funds embezzled by its officers. During the existence of this pro-
Vision an officer of a corporation in that state embezzled a large sum of money be• 
longing to the corporation, thus leaving the corporation insolvent. The creditors 
of the corporation commenced an action against the directors to recover for their 
use the amount of the money embezzled. During the pendency of this action and before 
judgment was obtained the provision of the constitution fixing liability upon the 
directors for embezzled funds was repealed. Immediately following the repeal the 
court sustained a motion of the directors to dismiss the action. The supreme court 
or the state sustained the lower court, holding that the liability created by the 
provision of the constitution was not contractual but was merely penal. Upon appeal 
to the Supreme Court of the United States the creditors contended: 
(l) That the court was not bound by the holding of the state supreme court 
that the constitution did not give a contractual right; and 
(2) That the creditors' rights were protected by the Constitution of the 
United States. 
Are the contentions of the creditors sound? 
(CONSTITUTIONAL LAW) Yes, on the authority of Coombes v. Getz,285 U.S.434(1931). 
l1erely calling the provision "penal" is not enough to p- event it from being con-
tractual as to the creditors who became such before the State Court decision. The 
holding as given by the Reporter in his headnote is in part as follows: 
(1) The right to enforce the liability was part of the creditor's contracts, per-
fected and fully vested before the repeal, and was protected by the contract clause 
of the Constitution and by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
(3) The so-called reserved power of a State over corporations and their share-
holders cannot be used to destroy the vested ri ghts of third persons or to impair 
the obligations of their contracts. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
"' 4 December 1962 • 580. l.b~as 0 1Line was denied a permit to erect a gasoline filling station by a municipal 
0o~poration in Virginia. The applicable ordinance of the city provided: 
11 The application for a permit will be filed with the Commissioner of the 
aeyenue and by him presented to the Council for its approval or dis-
approval. If the application be approved, the Council shall, by ordinance, 
authorize the issuance of a pennit, but if the application be disapproved 
the Council shall, by ordinance, refuse to grant a permit.n 
By a suit filed pursuant to the declaratory judgment act Gas 0'Line attacked the 
action of the city council in denying him a pennit upon the ground that ·the ordinance 
authorizing the council of the :city to deny a permit was unconstitutional and void. 
How should the court rule upon the contention oJ Gas O•Line? 
(CONSTITUTIONAL LAW) The Court should uphold Gas 0'Line•s contention. The ordinance 
fails to lay down any specific standards for the guidance of the council while it is 
acting in an administrative capacity. The council cannot~lidly grant or refuse to 
grant its approval at its whim. To allow others to operate filling stations and to 
refuse that privilege to Gas O'Line is depriving him of the equal protection of the 
J.aws. Note: If the matter involved is inherently dangerous to the public, or apt to 
be associated with crime(as in the case of pawnshops)or demands regulation for other 
legitimate reasons(as in the case of taxicabs) and reasonable standards are laid 
down by the law, then the privilege may be given to some and withheld from others. 
See 199 Va.70 on p.l833 of the Constitutional Law Cases in these notes. 
:){,~; 
3. ·Reeves, a resid~nt of Bangor, Maine.., was appointed to the of:f.j_ce of notary 
public by the Governor of that State, and he appeared before the Secretary of the 
State for the purpose of receiving his commission. Assume that a statute of Maine 
provides as follows: 
11A notary public being required to administer oaths, no person shall be 
issued a commission as a notary public of this State until he shall have 
first declared his belief in the existence of God." 
Reeves refused to declare his belief in the existence of God, as a result of which 
the Secretary declined to issue his corrnnission. Heeves instituted a mandamus pro-
ceeding in the proper court, seeking to cornpel the Secretary to issue him the 
commission, contending that the statute was unconstitutional as a violation of the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. The 
;>~Co 
s e~;retary u:::-ged that the statute wr.s not unconstitution-1.1 as to Ree-res, bec8.use l1e 
"'a '3 not compelled to hold the office of notary public. How should the court rL'.:!.E:'? 
(:.; ,)NSTI1'U1'IONli.L LAW) Mandemus will lifa Th8 first amendment to the Ur..ited States 
C;nsti t-ution is applicable to the States th~·ough the fourteenth. Hence v;e cannot. 
h~·;~ o.ny kind of a s'i:,ate religion and a belief in the e:r..istence of God cannot be 
r., :11 ~0 a condition of holding any public office. See 367 U.S.495 • 
. ...-
4~ " ·he Constit~tion of State X require:d that every adult, citi7.en be per:nitt.E;d to 
vo~e, suo\l)ect to his qualifications to vote being first detennined. 
Boob, an illit.erate beachcomber, was domiciled in State X but had never been 
registe-red to vot'3 therein. His interest in good eovernm€.nt. having been awakened, 
Boob r•Jquested the voting registrar of his home county to :t:·egister him so that he 
could vote in the forthcoming election. The registrar read to him a portion of the 
Constitution of State X, as follows: 
"Evei~y person presenting himself for regi~tration shal:!. , unless incapable solel.;r 
becau.se of physical impairment, be able to re::td and wri t a any section of the 
Cons-c,i tution of tl.1is State in thtJ English J.anr~uage. It 5hall be the duty of 
each county regisr.rar tv adminiet.er the provi:.dons of t..~1is section. 11 
Boob was unable to read or w;:-i te any parts of tho C.:cnE. ti tution, so that the 
registrar refused to register him. Boob inst.it.uteu tbe proper proceeding in a Cutil 't. 
of State X, seeking to have th") a.hove r0.quiremflnt declared u::1constitutional as a 
denial of the rights ~uaranteeC:. him ~nd.or the li'P.d.f;ral Constitution .• 
How should the cow.· -~ :rule? 
(CONSTITUTIONAL LAW) The re,p i:.:er,lent the. t one must bn able to read 3.nd write the 
English language(a literacy t~st that is fa~rly applied) i3 a reasonable requirement 
for the right to vote. The abiJJ. t.y to r oad C~.nd wr:i. te Englitih is nec.;)ssary for any 
intelligent choice of public, courses of acUon. See 360 UoS.45. 
p 03 4 Dec ember, 1963. 
1. sa.feway Trucking Company operated a freight line from Philadelphia1 Pa., to 
Jacksonville, Florida. Richmond, Va., was a transfer point. Thefts of liquor ship-
ments occurred at the transfer terminal, and the manager complained to a F.B.I. 
agent, telling him that he suspected Tony Amato of being connected with them. A day 
or two later, the F.B.I. agent, in company with a Richmond policeman, saw Amato and 
a companion, Oranto, drive up to the rear of an apartment house and saw Oranto 
carry some cartons from the house to the car. The officers tried to follow the car, 
but lost it in traffic. However, they later saw it parked and saw Amato and 
Oranto get in it and drive off. The officers followed and again &saw the car stop at 
the apartment house, and Oranto go in and come back out with th~e cartons which he 
placed in the back of the car. The officers drove up, placed both men under arrest 
and, upon searching the car, found two cartons .of radios consigned from Philadelphia 
to Jacksonville, and one carton of clothes consigned from Alexandria, Va., to 
Richmond, Va., The officers took Amato and Oranto to police headquarters and there, 
after further investigation, found that all three cartons had been stolen. Oranto 
was indicted in the u. S. District Court on the charge of possessing the stolen 
radios and in the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond for possessing the stolen 
clothes. Oranto promptly moved both C~urts to suupress the evidence as to finding 
the radios and clothes. How should each Court rule? 
(CONSTITUTIONAL LAW) The evidence should be suppressed in both courts. The arrest 
was illegal because without probable cause Oranto had not even been suspected of 
criminal activity prior to this time. Riding in a car, stopping in the rear cf an 
apartment house, picking up packages, driving away--these were all acts that were 
outwardly innocent.Since there was no lawful arrest, the principle that a reasonable 
search incident to an ·arrest is legal, has no application. Henry v. United States, 
361 u.s.98, eo s.ct.l68. 
The fourth amendment prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures is applicable 
to the states through the 14th amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.643. 
2 P ~e Board of Supervisors of Albemarle County adopted an ordinance dividing the 
county into six types of districts, one of which was classified as "Rural". A 
Board of Zoning Appeals was created and authorized to grant or deny applications 
for zoning and rezoning "as the Board sees fit, being guided in its d~cision by its 
opinion as to whether or not the proposed use would be desirable or advantageous to 
the neighborhood or the community or the county at large." 
A property owner consults you first, as to whether the Board of Supervisors had 
the right to enact a zoning ordinance and, secondly, whether the quoted ordinance 
is valid. How would you advise? 
(CONSTITUTIONAL LA\AJ) (l)V#l5-968 expressly gives the governing body of any oounty 
the right to enact zoning laws if certain conditions are complied with.(2)This 
particular ordinance is an invalid delegation of legislative power. It fails to set 
up reasonably adequate standards for the guidance of the Board ofr,Zoning Appeals. 
See 200 Va.637 on p.l924 of the Corporation Cases in these Not~s .. 
) 
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3. A Flori da s t atute granted women an absolute exempt-io:.1 from jury duty, based so1e1;v 
en t heir sex . The statute provided that women were not to be put on the ,jury list 
unless they had volunt ari ly registered for juJ:>y service. Flora Brow was indictnd 
o.nd t ried before an all male jury for murder in Florida, and that jur y returned a 
verdict fi nding her guilty of second degree murder. The record made in the t rial 
com·t showed: (l) that t he accused objected to the use of a jury panel that did no t 
i nclude women thereon, claiming that ~he panel was the product of a statute which 
viOrked an unconstitutional exclusion of women for jury servi ce; (2) that no i.;C>rrH~n 
i n the coun0y where the indictment was return-3d and where the accused was tried had 
voluntar i ly r egistered f or jury duty; and (3) t hat the accused killed her husLand 
upon l earning t hat her husband was guilty of infidel i ty. 
On appeal the accused sought to obtain a reversal of the judgment of conviction 
upon th~ ground that t he s tatute was unconstitutional. How should the Court rule? 
(CONSTITUTIO NAL L!\.vi) The Court should rule that the statut e is valid. Women are not 
ar bitrar i ly excl uded because of their sex. Any who wish to serve as ,jurors may 
voluntarily r egister f or jur y duty. The classification which gives thi s election 
t o women is a r easomble one. See 368 U .Sc$7. 
· -
• 
• 
J f ttiohmond Iron, Inc., was engag-ed in Virginia in the manufacture, sale and dis-
, tribution of reinforcing rodsu It maintained no office outside of Virgina, but sold 
· through a manufacturer's agent in New York, who sold on commission the products of 
Richmond Iron and other Companies. This agent solicited business in Pennsylvania 
. personally by trips through thct. State. Orders received by the a gent were submitted 
to Riclunond Iron at its Virg:in:La office, confirmed in Virginia and delivered FOB 
Richmond. Pennsylvania sought to impose its 47~ sales and use tax based on products 
· so received in that State, and sought to place the respons:tbility, under its 
statute, on Riclunond Iron to collect the sales and use tax on all reinforcing rods 
sold in the manner indicat~d, making prov-ision for reimbursement to Riclunond Iron 
of a percentage so collected in payment for said collection. Upon Riclunond Iron•s 
refusal, suit was brought in the U. S. Court of the Ea~tern District of Virginia by 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania against Richmond. Iron, Inc., to collect the tax. 
Issue 1-l&S joined to test the va.lidi ty of the Pennsylvania Tax in two particulars: 
(A) Did it place an improper burd<<n on interstate commerce, and 
(B) Did it v·iolate the due process cla.use of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution? How ought the Court rule? 
(CONS'r!TUTIONAL LAW) 'rhe Cou.rt should rule in favor of the Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania. '.rhere is no greater burden placed on R:i:elunond Iron, Inc. vrl. th respect to its 
Pennsylvania Sc'.les and the use tax than is placad on Pennsylv-ania sellers in 
Pennsylvania with respeot to such sales and the sales tax, nEquality is its themestt 
Hence there is no improper burdon on interstate comrr.erc e . 
Nor is the due process of law clause violat,?.d. It is conmon practice to require 
taxes to be lri theld by those i n the beo'~ rmsition t o withhold. This makes for 
ef~onomy of collection and lessens e·Jasion. Cooperation in such matters is an 
incident of good citi~enship. See 362 U .S.207. 4 December 1965. 
1. The Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, a legislative enactment.: prm.rit'! e1 
that the transportation of alcoholic beverages vTithin, into, or through the Str- ,_ ~ 
was prohibited except in accordance with regul~tions adoptad by the Alcvholic 
Beverage Control Board and empowered the Board to adopt such regulations as it 
deemed necessary to confine such transportation to l cgi timate purposes. I~agula\ j ': 1~ ;::; 
were adopted providing that any alcoholic beve ~:age oYer one gallon in q·'. ~ .• 1ti ty 
being transported within, into~ or thl~ough the State should be accompan~L~:d by c. 
bill of lading showing the consignor and consignee and the route to be ·i::ravelec:~ 
which must be a direct route and adhered to, and that the consignee mus t, have a 
. legal right to receive the shipment at the stated destination. 
Jack .Daniel::>, a Nor·iih Carolina Citizen, was apprehended in Virginia while driv:i nG 
a truck licensed in North Carol::..na~ owned by J. T. S e Brown, a North Carolina 
citizen, and loaded with 280 gallons of legally manufactured whiskey. D:miels [1;; .1 
a bill of lading naming a bema fide wholesaler in Dorsett, ~1aryland, as consigr·: 
and J. 1'. S. Brown in Garrett, 'North Carolina, as consignee but not desig!lating -..t!:y 
route to be traveled in Vir~Sinia although the truck "-'las, in f act, on the most 
direct route when apprehended. Under the lartls of North Carolina, Brovm could not 
lawfully receive such a shipment. 
On these facts, Daniels was convicted, and the truck and cal~go vJere confiscated 
under appropriate confiscatory statutes, Brown having intervened as owner of the 
truck and cargo. On appeal, appellants contended that the conviction and confisca-
t.irm Al-jould be reversed on the grounds that: (1) The law violated the rights of the appellants as citizens of North 
Carolina as it lvas extra-territorial in effect and was null and void 
insofar as concerning the rights of a non-resident to ship or receive 
alcoholic beverages not destined within Virginia, and 
(2) That such regulations concerning transportation through Virginia con-
stituted an undue burden on interstate commerce. 
How s hould the appellate court rule on each of these contenti.ons? 
(CONSTIUTIONAL LAW) Both contentions are without merit. The 21st amendment to the 
u.s. Constitution permits the states to regulate the sale and transportation of 
alcoholic beverages within the states and prohibits shipments into those states in 
violation of their laws. The regulations in the instant case are reasonably 
necessary to ~rcvent local diversions of interstate shipments of liquor. The 
Virginia law only applies while the liquor is being transported through Virginia 
and hence is not e:tra-terr~torial. The burden on interstate commerce is one that 
9.~~es, Keer and Long executed ane delivereq their promissory note for $5,000 to 
Murray. The note was not paid at maturity and Murray instituted action thereon 
against the three makers. The Clerk of the Court issued and delivered to the 
Sheriff notices of the motion for judgment, and the Sheriff delive-red one copy 
thereof to James in person on April 6, 1966; on the same day he mailed another to 
Ke.ar, and next day seeing Long on the street said to him: nr have at my office a 
notice of motion for judgment for you to appear before the Circuit Court of 
Roanoke County within the next twenty-one days to answer on that note you gave 
Murray for $51000. You have plenty of time to get a lawyer and defend the case, if 
you can. You had better attend to it; he might get judgment against you.tt 
Neither James, Keer or Long appeared and judgment was entered against all three 
of them on the note on May 2, 1966. 
James is insolvent and Keer and Long seek your advice on May 25th as to whether 
they can have this judgment set aside as to them or either of them. 
How ought you to advise them? 
(CONSTITUTIONAL LAW) Both Keer and Long may set aside the judgment against them as 
they have a constitutional right to personal service of process upon them respect-
ively. Va. Constitution#ll; 4th Ed. Burke, #353; 205 Va. 927; 120 Va. 30. 
~'~rman Douglas was placed on trial in the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond 
for the crime of murder in the first degree. After a lengthy trial, the jury re-
turned a verdict of guilty and Douglas was sentenced to life imprisonment. From this 
judgment, Douglas was granted an appeal by the Supreme Court of Appeals. On the 
appeal it was held that the lower court had committed error in instructi ng the jury 
and the conviction of Douglas was set aside. Shortly thereafter, Douglas was again 
brought to trial in the Hustings Court on the same indictment , He defended on the 
ground tha t he WD.S being placed twice in jeopar<.~.y cont ar y to the 5th and 14th 
Amendments, and moved t hat the case be dismi ssed. How should the Court rule on this 
defense? 
(CONSTITUTIONAL LAW) The Court should deny the defense. Where t he accused success-
fully seeks review of a convi ction, there i s no double j eopa:cdy upon a new tri al. 
Further~ even whr::re the::-e i s a new trial after co,17iction bee;c..use of errors it i s 
not the sor t of hardship to t he accused that is fo rbidden by t he 14th Amen~ent. 
9~tr{ ordinance of a 6ity in Virginia controlling t he grant i ng or denial of permits 
f or the erection of gasoline service s t ation provi des : 
"The appl i cation f or a permi t shall be f iled with the commissioner of t he 
Revenue and by hi m presented to t he Counci l f or its appr oval or disappr oval . 
I f, upon consi der at ion of t he application, the Council finds that t he 
publi c safety would be endanger ed by t he f i lling s t at ion fo r which 
application i s made , t he Counc i l shall , by ord i nance , refuse t o grant 
a permit ." 
After a hear i ng and cons i deration of an appl i cation for a permit , the Council of the 
City r efused to gr ant a permi t to Tex Phi llips , not because servi ce stat ions are 
i nher entl y danger ous but because t he f acts consi der ed by t he Counci l showed that the 
publ ic would be unnecessari l y endanger ed if t he service s t ation were erected and 
oper ated. Phillips ther eupon fi l ed a bill in chancer y att acking the constit ut ion-
al i t y of t he section of t he f oregoi ng ordi nance under which the r eques t was denied, 
and pr aying that the Ci t y be r equired t o issue the permit . Shoul d Phi llips pr evail ? 
(CONSTI TUTIONAL LAW & MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ) Yes . A city council i s empower ed both 
t o l egis l ate and admini strate; i n passing upon a permit t o er ect a gas station it 
is acti ng solely i n an administ rat i ve capaci t y . Notwithstanding the fac t that a 
council is deemed to have acted reasonably i n the exercise of its police powers and 
that every pr esumpt ion is in favor of t he validity of its acts , where there is no 
rul e or standard pr esent in the ordinance under which t he council is to be guided 
i n t he exercise of i t s admi nis trative power s , t his presumption fails and the 
ordinance is voi d$ 199 Va .70 . 
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3-~~trginia Fruit Corporation, a Delaware corporation authorized to do business 
in Virginia, purchased insurance policies in Wilmington, Delaware, covering risks 
on its property located in Virginia. The insurance company issuing these policies 
was not a Virginia corporation, nor was it licensed to write insurance in Virginia. 
Toaxes on the premiums paid under these policies were assessed against the Virginia 
Fruit Corporation under a Virginia statute providing that if any person or corpora-
tion shall purchase from an insurer not licensed in Virginia a policy of insurance 
covering risks within the state, other than through an insurance agent licensed in 
Virginia, such person a~ corporation shall pay a tax of S% on the amount of the 
gross premiums paid by the insured. The Virginia Fruit Corporation consults you and 
inquires whether it may be required to pay the tax. What would you advise? 
(CONSTITUTIONAL LAW) The Virginia Fruit Corporation is not required to pay the tax. 
Not withstanding the provision in lS USC Hl012(a) that the insurance business 
11 shall be subject to the laws of the several states what relate to the regulation 
or taxation of such business,n such state regulation or taxation is to be kept 
within the limits of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A state tax 
on premiums payable under a policy insuring property located within the state 
against loss or liability is invalid under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, where all the insurance transactions involved take place entirely outside 
the s tate, the insurers are not licensed to do nor do business in the state, the 
insured is a foreign corporation doing business in the state, losses under the 
policies are payable to the insured at its principal office in another state, and 
the only connection between the state and the insurance transactions is the fact 
that the property covered by the insurance is physically located in the state. 
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